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Non-technical summary
More than one third of the total EU budget is spent on so-called Cohe-
sion Policy via the structural funds. Its main purpose is to reduce dispar-
ities among EU regions and to promote economic growth and convergence.
Therefore, the convergence process of EU regions is a question of high politi-
cal importance. The overall empirical evidence points to a small convergence
effect of all or at least some European regions. However, whether or not this
potential success results from EU Cohesion Policy remains an open question.
The existing empirical evidence has provided mixed, if not contradictory, re-
sults. While some authors do find evidence of a positive impact of structural
funds on economic growth, others find little to no impact at all.
Against this background, this paper provides a fundamental review of the
econometric evaluation of EU Cohesion Policy in order to shed light on the
reasons for the diverging results. It has been shown that the econometric
evaluation of EU Cohesion Policy is hampered by several econometric issues.
Based on these issues we discuss potential solutions on how to cope with
these problems and discuss the related literature.
The most that can be concluded from empirical studies using country-level
data is that Cohesion Policy seems to be only conditionally effective. Given
a good quality institutional setup or decentralised governmental structures,
Cohesion Policy has a positive impact on growth. However, using regional
level data might be the preferable alternative because, first, EU Cohesion
Policy focuses on the development and convergence of regions and, second,
the robustness of the results is increased by the higher number of cross sec-
tions. The majority of the studies based on EU regions find at least a weak
positive effect.
One explanation for the weak results might be the fact that almost all
studies are derived from a neoclassical growth model assuming that EU Cohe-
sion Policy increases investments, and ultimately raising the economic growth
rate. However, there is some empirical evidence that Cohesion Policy may
only have a modest impact on investments. Moreover, we know very little
about the labour market impact of EU Cohesion Policy. Hence, one task for
future studies will be to investigate more thoroughly the channels through
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which EU Cohesion Policy works.
Another reason for the inconclusive empirical results might be that the
allocation of funds is at least partly determined by political-economic factors.
In this context, the allocation of Cohesion Policy is not solely based on
clear-cut criteria, rather there is room for political bargaining and/or side
payments. This might result in the funding of politically feasible, and less
economically efficient, projects.
Zusammenfassung
Mehr als ein Drittel des EU-Haushalts wird fu¨r die Koha¨sionspolitik ver-
wendet, deren Mittel u¨ber die so genannten Strukturfonds verausgabt wer-
den. Das zentrale Ziel dieser Politik besteht in der Verringerung von Dis-
parita¨ten zwischen den europa¨ischen Regionen und der Fo¨rderung von Wirt-
schaftswachstum und Konvergenz. Somit ist der Konvergenz-Prozess der Re-
gionen von hohem politischem Interesse. Die verfu¨gbaren empirischen Stu-
dien deuten auf einen geringen Konvergenzeffekt aller (zum Teil nur einiger)
europa¨ischer Regionen hin. Welche Rolle dabei allerdings die Koha¨sionspoli-
tik spielt, ist unklar, da entsprechende o¨konometrische Evaluationsstudien
keine eindeutige Evidenz liefern. Abgesehen von Studien, die positive Ef-
fekte auf das regionale Wachstum herausfinden, existieren auch solche, die
zu keinen oder sogar negativen Effekten gelangen.
Vor diesem Hintergrund ist es das Ziel dieser Studie, einen gru¨ndlichen
U¨berblick u¨ber die o¨konometrischen Studien zu geben und mo¨gliche Gru¨nde
fu¨r die divergierenden Ergebnisse zu durchleuchten. Es wird aufgezeigt, dass
die o¨konometrische Evaluation der Wachstums- und Konvergenzeffekte der
Koha¨sionspolitik mit einer Reihe von methodischen Schwierigkeiten verbun-
den ist. Hierauf aufbauend werden potentielle Lo¨sungen aufgezeigt und die
existierende Literatur diskutiert.
Es wird deutlich, dass aus o¨konometrischen Studien, die auf EU-La¨nder-
Daten basieren, ho¨chstens auf einen bedingt positiven Effekt der EU Koha¨-
sionspolitik geschlossen werden kann. Es zeigen sich nur dann positive Ef-
fekte, wenn bestimmte institutionelle Gegebenheiten vorliegen, wie beispiels-
weise eine dezentralisierte Regierungsstruktur oder eine hohe Qualita¨t o¨ffen-
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tlicher Institutionen. O¨konometrische Studien basierend auf Regionaldaten
sind aus zwei Gru¨nden vorzuziehen. Zum einen zielt die Koha¨sionspolitik ge-
rade auf Regionen ab. Zum anderen werden die Ergebnisse durch die gro¨ßere
Anzahl an Untersuchungseinheiten stabiler. Die Mehrzahl der Studien findet
leicht positive Wachstumseffekte der Koha¨sionspolitik auf regionaler Ebene.
Abschließend werden weitere mo¨gliche Gru¨nde fu¨r die insgesamt geringe
Wirksamkeit der Koha¨sionspolitik genannt. Eine mo¨gliche Erkla¨rung be-
steht darin, dass die empirischen Studien meist auf Annahmen der neo-
klassischen Wachstumstheorie basieren und (implizit) unterstellen, dass die
Koha¨sionspolitik die Investitionen erho¨ht und somit zu einer ho¨heren Wachs-
tumsrate beitra¨gt. Allerdings ist dieser investitionserho¨hende Effekt der
Koha¨sionspolitik nicht eindeutig nachgewiesen. Daru¨ber hinaus ist wenig
u¨ber die Arbeitsmarkteffekte der Koha¨sionspolitik bekannt. Dies zeigt, dass
die Untersuchung der Wirkungskana¨le der Koha¨sionspolitik von besonderem
Interesse ist.
Ein weiterer mo¨glicher Erkla¨rungsansatz fu¨r eine ineffektive Koha¨sions-
politik besteht darin, dass sich die regionale Verteilung der Mittel der Koha¨-
sionspolitik teilweise durch polito¨konomische Faktoren erkla¨ren la¨sst, wohin-
gegen die o¨konomische Notwendigkeit in diesen Fa¨llen nur eine untergeord-
nete Rolle spielt. Da Koha¨sionspolitik zu einem gewissen Grad als das Ergeb-
nis von Ausgleichszahlungen im Rahmen politischer Verhandlungsprozesse
zwischen den Mitgliedstaten zu interpretieren ist, erscheint es denkbar, dass
die Mittel nicht immer effizient verwendet werden.
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1 Introduction
More than one third of the total budget of the European Union (EU) is
spent on so-called Cohesion Policy1 via the structural funds (SF). Its main
purpose is to promote the “overall harmonious development” of the EU, to
reduce disparities between the levels of development of the various regions,
and to strengthen its “economic, social and territorial cohesion” (Article 158
of the Treaty establishing the European Community). By making explicit
the goal of reducing disparities in economic development, the Treaty implic-
itly requires that EU Cohesion Policy should affect resource allocation and
factor endowment to promote growth. Hence, “cohesion policies are aimed
at increasing investment to achieve higher growth and are not specifically
concerned either with expanding consumption directly or with redistribution
of income‘” (European Commission, 2001, p. 117).
European Cohesion Policy is successful if disparities between regions are
decreased. Therefore, the convergence-process of EU-regions is a question
of high political importance. Generally, the empirical evidence points to a
small convergence effect of all or some European regions at least (Barro and
Sala-i-Martin (1991); Sala-i-Martin (1996), see, for a survey, Eckey and Tu¨rk
(2006)). However, whether the potential success with regard to convergence
results from EU Cohesion Policy is an open question. Investigating the im-
pact of European Cohesion Policy on economic growth and convergence is a
wide research topic in applied econometric research. Nevertheless, the empir-
ical evidence has provided mixed, if not contradictory, results. While some
authors do find evidence of a positive impact of structural funds on economic
growth (e.g., Ramajo, Ma´rquez, Hewings and Salinas, 2008), others find little
(e.g., Esposti and Bussoletti, 2008) to no impact at all (e.g., Dall’erba and
Le Gallo, 2008).
Against this background, the aim of this chapter is to provide a funda-
mental review of the econometric evaluation of EU Cohesion Policy in order
to shed light on the reasons for the diverging results. To be more precise,
1In the following, the terms “EU Cohesion Policy” and “EU Regional Policy” are used
synonymously. Both refer to the policy of the EU to co-finance national projects mostly
carried out at the regional level by payments from the so-called “structural funds”.
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this chapter forms an introduction to the institutional background, presents
the theoretical framework used to evaluate EU Cohesion Policy, discusses
the main econometric issues and surveys the existing literature. Note that
this chapter does not include a discussion on the question of whether or not
and to what extent Cohesion Policy may be effective from a theoretical point
of view. A more general discussion on Regional Policy can be found in Jo-
vanovic (2009) or Baldwin and Wyplosz (2009). Furthermore, the spatial
effects of economic integration – also from the EU – are treated by Camagni
and Capello (2010).
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 starts
with a brief introduction to the institutional background, before section 3
explains how the effectiveness of EU Cohesion Policy can be evaluated. This
is followed by a review of the main econometric issues and an outline of
potential solutions in section 4, while section 5 discusses the related literature
against the background of sections 3 and 4. Finally, section 6 concludes and
provides some remarks for future research.
2 Institutional set-up of EU Cohesion Policy
The EU Cohesion Policy started in 1975 with the introduction of the Euro-
pean Regional Funds (ERDF). The ERDF focused on expenditure for devel-
opment projects in the poorer regions. Since that time, the Cohesion Policy
has gained importance; several additional funds have been created and it has
become the most important budget item comprising almost 36 percent of the
total EU budget in the period 2007-2013 (the second most important item is
the Common Agricultural Policy).
The Cohesion Policy can be divided into at least two policy regimes: be-
fore and after 1989. Before 1989, the EU budget was implemented annually
and the Regional Policy focused on the ERDF, where the main beneficiaries
were Italy, the UK, France, and Greece. After the passage of the Single Eu-
ropean Act in 1987, the regional policy was allocated within multi-annual
‘programme periods’, the first of which ran from 1989 to 1993.2 Most impor-
2The subsequent multi-annual frameworks comprise the following time periods: 1994-1999,
2000-2006 and 2007-2013.
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tantly, the explicit purpose of the Cohesion Policy was established, namely
to enhance cohesion and to reduce welfare disparities among the EU re-
gions. The EU also introduced a number of further financial instruments
to implement the structural policies. The most important of these are the
European Social Fund (ESF), the Guidance Section of the European Agri-
cultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) and the Cohesion Fund.
In addition, several allocation rules and guiding principles were introduced.
In our context, the main principle of Cohesion Policy is that the payments
by the EU have to be co-funded by the member states and must not crowd
out national/regional policy expenditures.
Since 1989, European Cohesion Policy addresses regional problems under
various so-called “objectives”. These objectives reflect the key priorities for
EU expenditures. They are listed for the last two financial periods in Table
1. The current Cohesion Policy (for the period 2007-2013) is not described
here since it has not been taken into account in econometric studies yet.3
The most important objective by far is to support lagging regions (the so-
called Objective 1 regions), comprising approximately 75 percent of the total
SF. The other objectives are targeted at areas affected by industrial decline
(Objective 2), fighting long-term unemployment (Objective 3), adaptation
to industrial change (Objective 4), reform of agricultural sectors (Objective
5a), rural areas (Objective 5b) and sparsely populated areas (Objective 6).
Note that there is a clear-cut definition on what qualifies a region as an
Objective 1 receiver (regional GDP has to be lower than 75 percent of the
EU average), while a clear allocation scheme is missing in the case of the
latter two objectives. Table 1 shows that both the number and the definition
of the objectives are not fixed over time, but rather that they vary over
the programme periods. For example, the number of objectives was reduced
3Since 2007, the EU Cohesion policy has revolved around three new (rearranged) objec-
tives: (1.) Convergence (formerly Objective 1) (81.7% of total Cohesion Policy pay-
ments): support for growth and job creation in the least developed member states and
regions (GDP per capita less than 75% of the EU average). (2.) Competitiveness and
employment (formerly Objective 2) (15.8%): designed to help the richer member states to
deal with economic and social change, globalisation and the transition to the knowledge
based society. (3.) Territorial cooperation: to stimulate cross-border co-operation, the
development of economic relations and the networking of member states.
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from six to three in the financial framework 2000-2006 in order to strengthen
the concentration of EU support.4 However, this rearrangement was purely
cosmetic, as the same eligibility criteria continued under different labels.
This corresponds precisely to one conclusion which can be drawn from the
history of Cohesion Policy: Once introduced, a particular objective is rarely
(completely) phased out in future.
Table 1 approximately here
Figure 1 shows the historical development, including the total (nominal)
EU Cohesion Policy payments5(vertical bars) and their shares relative to
the EU-GNI (solid line) and to the public national spending (dotted line).
It becomes clear that there is a long-term upward trend in payments when
measured in absolute terms, which can be explained, inter alia, by the en-
largement steps of the EU (1973: EU-9, 1981: EU-10, 1986: EU-12, 1995:
EU-15, 2004: EU-25, 2007: EU-27). By contrast, payments measured as per-
cent of EU-GNI or public national spending have almost remained constant
since 1993. Furthermore, Figure 1 shows that – on average – SF payments
do not seem to be particularly large compared to total public spending with
an EU-27 average of below 0.7 percent in 2007.
Figure 1 approximately here
However, focusing on the relatively small EU-average share might obscure
the fact that the EU regional policy is quite important for some countries.
Figure 2 compares the Cohesion Policy payments with the public invest-
ment in the member states. It becomes clear that EU spending is quite
important for the poorest countries, that is, those countries receiving money
from the Cohesion Fund, namely the so-called “old” (Spain, Greece, Ireland,
and Portugal) and “new” (Eastern European countries) cohesion countries.
In addition, focusing on the regional level, EU spending has a particularly
4There has been a recent discussion on whether further objectives should be introduced.
Proposals focused on aid for regions/countries with climate change, environmental prob-
lems or strong demographic changes (European Commission, 2007).
5These are the ERDF, the ESF, the EAGGF, and the Financial Instrument for Fisheries
Guidance (FIFG), as well as the Cohesion Fund and the Instrument for Structural Policies
for Pre-accession (ISPA) for the accession countries.
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high importance for some regions (e.g., Extremadura received more than 2.7
percent of EU support (as percent of GDP) in 2002). Thus, these figures
illustrate two aspects: First, EU policy matters at least in some regions
and/or member states. Second, given the volume of the spending, it may in-
deed be difficult for some countries to absorb the transfers and to co-finance
European projects without cutting expenses elsewhere.
Figure 2 approximately here
Furthermore, it should be noted that ever since the introduction of the
multi-annual financial framework, the European Commission determines so-
called “commitments”, which do not have to be equal to the final flows of
EU support, the so-called SF “payments”. For example, due to missing
absorption capability, the commitments may not be entirely depleted or may
be called up with a delay of one or two years. In this context, the so-called
N+2 rule states that SF payments have to be called up with a delay of two
years at the latest. This introduces big time lags between the determination
of the eligibility for EU funding and the final flows of EU money. Figure 3
clarifies this issue by using the current financial framework 2007-2013 as an
example. The statistical data basis to determine which regions receive EU
support is based on the annual averages of the years 2000-2002, whereas the
list of supported regions is published in 2006. As the financial framework
runs from 2007-2013 the latest possibility to call up EU support is in 2015
due to the N+2 rule. Hence, there is a gap of up to 15 years between the
underlying statistical data and the calling up of EU support.
Figure 3 approximately here
Finally, some studies try to explain the entire development of the EU
expenditure (and revenue) side in the light of political negotiation processes.
Due to the veto power, Cohesion Policy is affected by side payments and
the bargaining power of the EU member states (e.g., Blankart and Kirchner,
2003; Feld, 2005; Feld and Schnellenbach, 2007). A prominent example is
the establishment of the Cohesion Fund in 1994, which can be explained by
the fact that the poor countries had to be compensated against losses of the
single currency of the European Monetary Union (van der Beek and Neal,
2004).
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3 Measuring the effectiveness of Cohesion
Policy
There are several approaches to the evaluation of Cohesion Policy. One may
distinguish between ex ante and ex post studies on the one hand, and qual-
itative, as well as quantitative, methods on the other hand. Qualitative
studies are, for example, case studies. Since this type of study is beyond
the scope of this chapter, a discussion is omitted here (for example, Davies,
Bachtler, Gross, Michie, Vironen and Yuill, 2007; Milio, 2007). With regard
to quantitative studies, one may distinguish between macroeconomic simu-
lation studies (which can be used for ex ante, as well as ex post, evaluations;
e.g. Bradley and Untiedt, 2007) on the one hand and (ex post) econometric
studies on the other hand. The results of the simulation studies strongly
depend on the – more or less – plausible assumptions. For example, in this
respect it is often assumed that EU Cohesion Policy leads to an increase in
investments and that these are profitable. However, this assumption typi-
cally leads to the result that all models indicate a positive effect of Cohesion
Policy. Hence, the results of simulation models can be interpreted as an esti-
mate of the potential of Cohesion Policy and should not be taken as empirical
evidence in favour of its effectiveness.
As a consequence, we focus on (quantitative ex post) econometric studies
here. In these studies the sample consists of EU countries or regions. Be-
yond this, there are microeconometric studies using individual level or firm
level data evaluating the effects of single programmes (co-)financed by SF
on various outcome variables at the micro-level. For example, Bondonio and
Greenbaum (2006) analyse the effects of (Objective 2) business investment
incentives on employment using firm-level data.
So far, theoretically founded econometric evaluations of the Cohesion
Policy have mostly been based on the neoclassical growth theory.6 In the
6Roughly speaking, the theoretical approaches can be classified as growth theories and
trade theories and one can distinguish between “new” and “traditional” approaches.
These have diametric political implications (Heinemann, Hagen, Mohl, Osterloh and Sel-
lenthin, 2009). For example, while traditional neoclassical growth theory (Solow, 1956;
Swan, 1956) implies that regional policy have no long-term effects, the new economic
6
following, it is shown how this theory is applied to panel data, although it
was originally applied to cross-sectional data.7
The literature on the convergence of income levels (e.g., GDP per capita)
distinguishes between the so-called β– and σ–convergence. The former pre-
dicts that if countries have the same steady-state determinants converging
to a common balanced growth path, then those countries with relatively low
initial income levels grow faster than richer countries (Durlauf, Johnson and
Temple, 2005, p. 585). Moreover, β–convergence can be easily evaluated in
a linear regression context, e.g. of the neoclassical growth model. Assuming
that β–convergence holds for i = 1, ..., N regions, the natural logarithm of
income y of region i at time t (e.g., measured as GDP per capita) can be
approximated by:
ln(yit) = α + (1 − β) ln(yit−1) + uit, (1)
where and is an i.i.d. error term (Sala-i-Martin, 1996; Young, Higgins and
Daniel, 2008). Since is assumed to be constant across regions, the balanced
growth paths are identical. Rearranging (1) yields to the more common
version of the neoclassical growth model (Young, Higgins and Daniel, 2008):
ln(yit) − ln(yit−1) = α + β ln(yit−1) + uit. (2)
Hence, β < 0 implies a negative correlation between growth and initial
log income.8
The neoclassical growth model assumes that economies (countries or re-
gions) with similar economic conditions converge with respect to their income
level. Absolute / unconditional convergence refers to an inverse relationship
between the growth of income and the initial level if control variables are
geography (Krugman, 1991; Krugman and Venables, 1995) indicates positive effects on
regional convergence under certain circumstances. Nevertheless, the latter also predicts
a trade-off between growth and convergence. From the perspective of the new (endoge-
nous) growth theory (Romer, 1986, 1990), regional policy may have long-term effects if
it promotes R&D or human capital.
7A more general survey which includes cross section as well as time series data can be
found in Magrini (2004).
8yit may also indicate the GDP per capita of the region i relative to the aggregate GDP
per capita of all regions at time t. In doing so, common time effects are cancelled out
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absent, i.e., a significantly negative β̂ in the regression framework described
above. Conditional convergence prevails if this relationship still holds af-
ter conditioning on further variables. Hence, the neoclassical growth model
predicts a negative β. Empirical studies provide evidence in favour of both
hypotheses (Islam, 1995, 2003; Cuaresma, Ritzberger-Gru¨nwald and Silgoner,
2008). The estimated convergence rates are typically a little lower in cross-
section studies (approximately 2 percent per year Barro and Sala-i Martin,
2004) than in panel studies (Lee, Pesaran and Smith, 1998).9
To make the distinction between conditional and unconditional conver-
gence clear, we plug fixed regional or country effects into equation (2) and
distinguish two simple regression equations for regional-level data (Ederveen,
Gorter, de Mooij and Nahuis, 2002):
ln(yit) − ln(yit−1) = α + β ln(yit−1) + ci + uit, (3)
ln(yit) − ln(yit−1) = α + β ln(yit−1) + µi + uit, (4)
with ci denoting country-specific fixed effects (a set of country dummies)
and µi region-specific fixed effects (a set of region dummies).
While β in equation (2) is a measure of absolute convergence, (3) and
(4) provide estimates of conditional convergence. To be precise, equation
(3) analyses convergence conditional on whether a region lies in a particu-
lar country. Thus, it allows for differences in steady states of income be-
tween country 1 and country 2 (country-specific steady states). It assumes,
however, that within countries, different regions receive equal income levels.
Equation (4) assumes region-specific steady-states, that is, there may be in-
come gaps between regions which are never bridged even within countries
(for a more detailed discussion on this topic see Islam, 2003).
The concept of σ–convergence is a measure of statistical dispersion of
income at period T (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1991, 1992). σ-convergence
holds if the dispersion of income levels declines between t and t+T (Durlauf,
Johnson and Temple, 2005), i.e., if:
σ2ln yt − σ2ln yt+T > 0. (5)
9For a critical review on the 2 percent finding see Quah (1996).
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The concepts of β– and σ–convergence are linked: β–convergence provides
the necessary, but not the sufficient, condition for σ–convergence. As a con-
sequence, σ–convergence can only be achieved with β–convergence, whereas
this does not hold the other way round. Hence, even if β–convergence can
be observed (poorer regions grow faster than richer ones), the dispersion be-
tween the income levels of regions may increase, so that there would be no
σ–convergence.
Almost all econometric studies analyzing the growth effects of EU re-
gional policy are based on a neoclassical growth model of the type Solow
(1956) and Swan (1956), that is, equation (2) is augmented by further theory-
driven variables. In this context, SF payments are assumed to correspond to
investments (Ederveen, de Groot and Nahuis, 2006; Ba¨hr, 2008; Mohl and
Hagen, 2008). A regression equation for regional data may be specified as:
ln(yit) − ln(yit−1) =α + β1 ln(yit−1) + β2 ln(sfit−1) + β3 ln(savit−1)+
β4 (nit−1 + g + δ) + β5 ln(educit−1) + µi + λt + uit,
(6)
where savit−1 is the saving rate, nit−1 is the population growth rate, g
and δ stand for the technological progress and the time discount factor. Most
authors follow the seminal paper by Mankiw, Romer and Weill (1992) and
assume that g and δ are constant over time and region and jointly amount
to 5%. Furthermore, educit−1 measures the education level of the population
(e.g., percentage share of population with higher education). Finally, equa-
tion (6) includes fixed-region effects (µi) as well as fixed time effects (λt).
The reasons for their inclusion will be discussed in section 4.
The main variable of interest in this kind of literature is the SF variable
(sfit−1), which is expressed as payments as a share of nominal GDP (among
others, Ba¨hr, 2008) or as percent of persons employed (e.g., Esposti and
Bussoletti, 2008). If the estimate of is positive and significantly different
from zero, the SF payments positively affect the regions’ steady-state growth
rate, hence, they enhance the transitional growth rate of each region towards
its own steady state (Dall’erba and Le Gallo, 2008).
Most papers only focus on the evaluation of the sign of the coefficient
of SF and neglect the size of its impact. However, the latter should be of
relevance since an expensive EU regional policy with a tiny size effect might
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be effective but not “cost-efficient”. Those authors who discuss the size
effect usually interpret the short-term elasticity of the impact. Given that
the variables of equation (6) are specified in logarithmic terms, a one percent
increase of the SF variable increases the growth rate by β̂2 percent. However,
note that equation (6) equals the dynamic approach shown in equation (1),
so that it is more convincing to interpret the long-term impact of variables,
which can simply be calculated as φ̂ = (β̂2/− β̂1) in the case of SF payments.
The long-term elasticity can be interpreted as showing that a one percent
increase of SF payments (as percent of GDP) raises the real GDP per capita
by φ̂ percent. Unfortunately, most studies do not discuss the quantitative
long-term impact.
Note that regressions of the type of equation (6) only allow for an esti-
mation of the effect of SF payments on growth, and hence we cannot learn
directly from β̂2 whether or not a poor region A catches up with a rich region
B. However, this is precisely one important aim of Cohesion Policy. What
we learn from β̂2 is “only” whether and to what extent SF promotes growth.
Nevertheless, since the allocation criteria of the SF (in the case of Objective
1 payments, as well as total SF payments) imply a negative correlation be-
tween the level of GDP per capita and SF payments, a significantly positive
β̂2 can be interpreted as an indication for convergence at least.
In order to directly measure the effects of Cohesion Policy on conver-
gence, Eggert, von Ehrlich, Fenge and Ko¨nig (2007) propose the following
specification using regional data:
ln(yit) − ln(yit−1) =α + β1 ln(yit−1) + β2 ln(sfit−1)+
c ln(yit−1) ln(sfit−1) + ...+ uit.
(7)
This equation states that the estimated effect of SF payments depends
on the initial income level. In this case β̂2 indicates the impact of SF pay-
ments given an initial income level (yit−1) equalling zero, which is obviously
of no use as there are no regions with a GDP of zero. Given a positive
β̂2, a negative ĉ implies that this positive effect declines with an increasing
initial income level, which, in turn, may be interpreted as a sign of conver-
gence. One possibility of deriving meaningful quantitative conclusions from
equation (7) is to calculate the marginal effects of SF payments across the ob-
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served range of initial income level (yit−1) by: β̂2 + ĉ ln(yit−1). Subsequently,
these marginal effects might be illustrated graphically including confidence
intervals around the slope to show the statistical significance level (Brambor,
Clark and Golder, 2006).
Several studies, especially those using country-level data (e.g., Ederveen,
de Groot and Nahuis, 2006; Ba¨hr, 2008), investigate whether the effectiveness
of SF payments depends on institutional and economic aspects of the country,
such as the quality of institutions,10 the member states’ federal structure
(decentralisation) or the openness to trade. They use specifications similar
to the following:
ln(yit) − ln(yit−1) =α + β1 ln(yit−1) + β2 ln(sfit−1) + c1 condit+
c2 condit ln(sfit−1) + ...+ uit,
(8)
where condit denotes a variable including the aspects of the country i in
year t and condit ln(sfit−1) is an interaction term. Solid results should again
be derived by calculating and illustrating the marginal effects as indicated
above.
A further issue is the question through which channel SF payments af-
fect growth. The assumption underlying virtually all empirical studies is
that the Cohesion Policy increases regional investments leading to a higher
steady-state capital stock per capita and, ultimately, to a higher GDP. This
may be justified by the nature of SF spending which consists predominantly
of investments. However, as pointed out by Esposti and Bussoletti (2008)
or Bouvet (2005), SF payments may influence long-run growth in two more
ways within the neoclassical growth model. First, it may increase the initial
level or the growth of the regional total factor productivity (TFP). Sec-
ond, it may affect the labour market, that is, the growth rate of the initial
workforce. One problem here concerns the many neoclassical growth specifi-
cations, which (implicitly) assume full employment or constant employment
rates over time, as well as across regions. Since the employment rates dif-
fer between European states and evolve differently over time, and since SF
payments are likely to affect employment, Esposti and Bussoletti (2008) pro-
10Ederveen, de Groot and Nahuis (2006) use, for example, the World Bank governance
indicators “political stability”, “government effectiveness” and “rule of law”.
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pose using growth of GDP per employment (which corresponds to average
labour productivity) rather than growth of GDP per capita as a dependent
variable. However, it may be argued that the goal of Cohesion Policy is to
promote convergence of GDP per capita, implying that this variable is more
appropriate. Nevertheless, Esposti and Bussoletti’s argument points to the
fact that it is necessary to evaluate the labour market effects of Cohesion
Policy, an undertaking that has been neglected so far (exceptions are Becker,
Egger, von Ehrlich and Fenge, 2008; Bouvet, 2005; Dall’erba and Le Gallo,
2007).
4 Main econometric issues and potential so-
lutions
When estimating the effects of SF payments on economic growth and con-
vergence, several methodological issues have to be considered.
The estimation of the relationship between SF payments and the growth
rates in regions or countries is complicated by the potential endogeneity
problem, i.e., the fact that within a regression model such as equation (6),
the covariance between at least one of the explanatory variables (e.g., the SF
variable) and the disturbance term is not equal to zero (Wooldridge, 2002).
This endogeneity may be attributed to the following four issues:
First of all, there is the danger of biased estimates due to reverse causality,
leading to an underestimation of the effectiveness. The allocation criteria of
the SF commitments are likely to be correlated with the dependent variable
“economic growth”. First and foremost, the allocation of SF is based on the
ratio of the regional GDP per capita (in PPS) and the EU-wide GDP. If this
ratio is below 75 percent, the region is a so-called Objective 1 region, implying
that it is eligible for the highest transfers relative to GDP. Furthermore,
the allocation of Objectives 2 and 3 depends, inter alia, on the regional
unemployment rate, the employment structure, and the population density.
Moreover, the effective payments by the Commission to the regions depend on
the regions’ or countries’ abilities to initiate and to co-finance these projects.
This ability may be higher in times of higher economic growth rates, e.g., due
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to higher tax revenues. Nevertheless, some authors argue that the problem of
reverse causality might be mitigated by the multi-annual programme periods,
in which the determination of the eligibility for EU funding is made several
years before the actual flows of EU spending (see in section 2).
Second, there may be unobserved variables (unobserved heterogeneity) or
(due to missing data availability) omitted variables, which have an impact
on the regional growth rates, but which are not included in the equation and
are thus part of the error term of the specification. If these omitted variables
are correlated with one explanatory variable, this explanatory variable is
endogenous. A special case of an omitted variable bias is the relevance of
spillover effects: SF payments may increase the economic growth rate which,
in turn, may affect the neighbour’s growth positively. If these spillover effects
cannot be separated from the “original” impulse, the estimated effect of SF
payments is biased. This problem might be of less importance when using
country data. By contrast, there is strong empirical evidence indicating that
regional spillover effects do play a significant role at the regional level (Arbia,
Le Gallo and Piras, 2008; Abreu, de Groot and Florax, 2005). Hence, the
effects of Cohesion Policy in one region are obviously not limited to that
region, since there are regional spillovers to other (neighbouring) regions.
The fact that the European classification of regions is based on political,
rather than on economic, criteria intensifies this problem.
Third, keeping the identity of equations (1) and (2) of section 2 in mind,
it is obvious that equation (3) equals a dynamic approach. Hence, simply
applying a fixed effects estimator in a dynamic setup leads to a correlation
of the lagged dependent variable and the error term results in an underesti-
mation of the lagged dependent variable which is well-known as the Nickell
bias (Nickell, 1981; Magrini, 2004).
A fourth problem is related to measurement errors. This problem is of
special concern with regard to the SF variable at the regional level. The an-
nual reports on SF published by the European Commission only comprise re-
gional commitments and payments for the period 1994-1999. Unfortunately,
since 2000, these reports only contain data at the country level. Further-
more, before 1994, only SF commitments are available. However, using SF
commitments instead of payments might lead to biased results. Depending
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on the assumptions on how SF commitments and payments are correlated,
SF commitments might be correlated with the error term. By contrast, the
problem of data availability with regard to SF payments is less severe at the
country level. Despite that, to the best of our knowledge, it is not possible to
distinguish between the different objectives and funds for a long time period,
there is at least information on the total EU regional policy payments for
the time period 1976-2007 (European Commission, 2008).11
Apart from these endogeneity-related aspects, the estimations might be
biased by a fifth issue. Although growth theory provides well-established
suggestions for the estimation of growth relationships, it is ex ante not clear
which economic growth model to use and which functional form is appropri-
ate for the effect of SF payments (Durlauf, Kourtellos and Tan, 2008). There
may be non-linearities and interactions with covariates, which may lead to
biased estimates if they are not taken into account. Similarly, the “real”
impact of EU regional policy on growth might be misspecified because the
time structure of its effects is ex ante unknown. It may be argued that SF
projects, such as infrastructure investments, only become effective for growth
after some time lag.
Finally, a fundamental – but often ignored – sixth econometric problem is
related to the choice of the appropriate control variables, i.e., which variables
should be included in the right-hand side of the regression model. For exam-
ple, one may derive from growth theory that growth of GDP per capita is
affected by (private and public) investments and that an omission may bias
the estimated results. However, the inclusion of the investment variable into
the regression evaluating the growth effects of SF payments might lead to bi-
ased results. Since SF payments may stimulate growth through the channel
11With respect to further economic and socio-demographic control variables included in
estimations using regional data, Eurostat provides a relatively large database with the
most relevant variables. However, for a longer time period, there are, to the best of our
knowledge, no high-quality education data at the regional level like those proposed at
the country level by de La Fuente and Dome´nech (2006); Barro and Lee (2001); Cohen
and Soto (2007). Instead, there is only data available since 1999, which measures the
population aged 15 years and over with a high, medium or low level of education. For
this reason, Mohl and Hagen (2008) use the number of patents per million inhabitants
as a proxy for the education variable.
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“investment” (leading to a higher steady-state capital stock per capita), the
inclusion of the investment variable might render it impossible to evaluate
the investment increasing effect of SF payments on growth. More generally:
One should be careful not to include control variables which may also serve
as a dependent variable of Cohesion Policy (Angrist and Pischke, 2009, call
these variables “bad controls”).
Obviously, given the current state-of-the-art econometric models and the
available data, it is not possible to deal with all the problems mentioned above
simultaneously. However, by taking into account the methodological issues
and by comparing the results of several empirical approaches, one might
hope to get an idea about the range of the “true effect” of SF payments on
growth. There exist at least a few potential approaches to coping with the
issues presented above individually, as will be illustrated in the following.
To start with, using panel data helps to solve some problems. If (un-)
observed omitted variables affecting growth are constant over time, they are
eliminated by including fixed effects or by first-differencing. If these unob-
served variables are not constant, methods such as instrumental variable (IV)
estimators are necessary. Moreover, unobserved time effects (such as com-
mon macroeconomic shocks) influencing growth might be relevant (Bond,
Hoeffler and Temple, 2001). A very common and flexible approach to avoid-
ing parametric assumptions is to use a set of common (e.g., annual) time
dummies which can control for effects common to all regional units, such as
pan-European business cycles (see equation (3)). This may also reduce the
problem of regional spillovers (Bronzini and Piselli, 2009). In order to avoid
that the use of time dummies leads to a significant loss of degrees of free-
dom (which is most relevant in case of popular general method of moments
(GMM) estimators due to the matrix of instruments), one may transform the
variables into deviations from time means (i.e., the mean across the N indi-
vidual regions for each period) which is equivalent to the use of time dummies
(Bond, Hoeffler and Temple, 2001). If necessary, time effects may be mod-
eled in a more complex manner: For example, one may allow for country-time
specific effects in regional data by defining country-specific annual dummies.
Another approach is to define country-specific or region-specific time trends
(Wooldridge, 2002; Hagen and Mohl, 2009).
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In order to deal with the first and second problem, an IV estimator
combined with fixed effects or first differences seems to be the right choice.
However, to the best of our knowledge, no convincing external IV has been
proposed in the literature (exceptions may be the studies by Dall’erba and
Le Gallo, 2008; Bouvet, 2005, summarised in section 5). Hence, identification
has to be based on internal instruments via the GMM estimators (Arellano
and Bond, 1991; Roodman, 2009b). In addition, GMM estimators are also
suitable for dealing with the third issue introduced above, by instrumenting
the initial income level (as well as further variables) by lagged values. On
the one hand, there is evidence that the first-differenced GMM (FD-GMM)
estimator by Arellano and Bond (1991) has a large finite sample bias and
poor precisions when the time series are persistent, so that the system GMM
(SYS-GMM) estimator by Blundell and Bond (1998) should be preferred. On
the other hand, some applications question the superiority of the SYS-GMM
estimator because the additional instruments might not be valid (Lucchetti,
Papi and Zazzaro, 2001). Hence, one might apply different estimators to
draw well-founded conclusions. Note that the consistency of both GMM es-
timators is based on large N, which might not be given in the analyses using
country-level data. However, there is preliminary evidence of Monte Carlo
simulations showing that, given pre-determined explanatory variables, the
SYS-GMM estimator has a lower bias and higher efficiency than the FD-
GMM or the fixed effects estimator (Soto, 2006). Nevertheless, country-level
data (such as EU-15 data) may still be too small for GMM estimations.
One should be careful as regards the use of instruments when apply-
ing GMM estimators: Using too many instruments can overfit instrumented
variables (Roodman, 2009a), reduce the power properties of the Hansen test
(Bowsher, 2002) and lead to a downward bias in two-step standard errors
(Windmeijer, 2005).12 One solution might be to include lag limits or to col-
lapse the set of instruments.13 Since an increasing number of studies on the
effects of Cohesion Policy apply GMM estimators, these aspects are highly
12Roodman (2009a, p. 156): “Perhaps, the lesson to be drawn is that internal instruments,
though attractive as a response to endogeneity, have serious limitations”.
13However, the choice of the number of lags used as instruments or the possibility of
collapsing the number of instruments might seem arbitrary.
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relevant and should be taken into account in order to avoid misleading esti-
mation results.
Applying spatial panel econometric techniques helps to control for spatial
spillover effects, which is of special concern when using region-level data (for
a survey see LeSage and Pace, 2009). The usual approach is to specify a
weight matrix containing information on the number of or distance of neigh-
bours (Anselin, Florax and Rey, 2004). This is done by focusing on the (i)
contiguity of each region, (ii) its k-nearest neighbours, or (iii) the geographi-
cal distance (e.g., expressed in kilometers) to its neighbours. Sometimes the
weight matrices are weighted by some economic variables (e.g., using trade
data between regions). However, often geographical distance based weight
matrices are preferred because they are strictly exogenous. Nevertheless, the
right choice of the weight matrix is of fundamental concern as incorrectly
specified weight matrices might lead to wrong conclusions (LeSage and Fis-
cher, 2008).
Generally speaking, including a weight matrix does affect the efficiency
and/or the consistency of the OLS estimator leading to biased results. Hence,
the spatial econometric estimations are usually estimated by Maximum Like-
lihood (Anselin, 1988; Anselin and Hudak, 1992; Elhorst, 2010) or by GMM
(Kelejian and Prucha, 1998, 1999; Bell and Bockstael, 2000). There are
two predominant approaches to specifying the spatial model: One can ei-
ther include a spatially weighted dependent variable (the so-called “spatial
lag model”) or a spatially autocorrelated error (“spatial error model”) into
the regression model. These approaches were originally focused on cross-
sectional (Anselin, 1988; Anselin and Bera, 1998; Anselin, 2006) and static
panel datasets (Elhorst, 2003) and they have been extended to the case of
dynamic panel estimators (Badinger, Mu¨ller and Tondl, 2004; Yu, de Jong
and Lee, 2008). Recently, further approaches have been introduced, such
as including both spatial lag and spatial error simultaneously (Kelejian and
Prucha, 1998; Lee, 2003) or including spatially weighted independent vari-
ables (the so-called spatial Durban model, see, e.g., Elhorst, Piras and Arbia,
2006; Ertur and Koch, 2007). Unfortunately, there is as yet no estimator
which controls for both spatial spillover and endogeneity of further indepen-
dent variables (besides the lagged dependent variable) within a panel data
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framework.
The fourth problem should be addressed by using SF payments instead of
commitments. As mentioned in section 2, the differences between payments
and commitments can be sizable.
As regards the fifth problem, almost all studies are based on a neoclas-
sical growth model. Despite some criticism due to its strict assumptions
(Dall’erba and Le Gallo, 2008), the use of the neoclassical growth model
might be explained by the limited data availability at the regional level.14
Possible approaches to this problem have been proposed by Becker, Egger,
von Ehrlich and Fenge (2008) as well as by Hagen and Mohl (2008), who
avoid strict functional form assumptions by using treatment effect methods
(for a recent survey for applied researchers see Austin, 2007). These studies
will be summarised in section 5 in greater detail.
In order to take into account that SF payments might be effective after
some time lag, Rodr´ıguez-Pose and Fratesi (2004) as well as Mohl and Ha-
gen (2008) include past values of the SF variable besides contemporaneous
values. For example, Mohl and Hagen (2008) start their empirical analyses
by excluding any SF variable, and then gradually add the lagged SF pay-
ments, beginning with a lag of one year and ending up with a specification
comprising SF with a lag of one to five years (
∑5
j=1 ln SFi,t−j).
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5 Empirical evidence
The main aspects of the previous literature on the impact of Cohesion Pol-
icy on economic growth are summarised in the following. We distinguish
between studies using country-level data (Table 2), regional-level data in a
multi-country framework (Table 3), and regional-level data within one county
14For a recent empirical comparison of different theoretical convergence models at the
European regional level, see Arbia, Le Gallo and Piras (2008).
15Due to multicollinearity, the coefficients and standard errors of the SF variable cannot
be interpreted if the variable is included into the regression with several lags. As a
consequence, Mohl and Hagen (2008) calculate the joint sum of SF coefficients corre-
sponding to the short-term elasticity and use a simple Wald test to determine whether
this short-term elasticity is statistically different from zero. Based on this, it is possible
to calculate the long-term elasticity as described above.
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(Table 4).
Generally, EU regions are classified into three different groups by the Eu-
ropean Commission according to the “Nomenclature des unites territoriales
statistiques” (NUTS). These units refer to the country level (NUTS-0) and
to three lower subdivisions (NUTS-1, NUTS-2 and NUTS-3) which are clas-
sified according to the size of population (Eurostat, 2007). The advantage
of regional data for econometric analyses is the resulting large sample size
which allows the application of methods based on a large number of cross
sections (N ). Furthermore, regions (as opposed to countries) are usually the
unit of interest for Cohesion Policy. By contrast, using country-level data
comes with the advantage of larger data availability but with the drawback
of small sample sizes (EU-12, EU-15 etc.). Moreover, region-specific effects
cannot be analysed by definition.
Apart from the choice of the appropriate sample, the studies differ in the
time period covered, the econometric methods applied, the type of dataset
used (cross-section versus panel) and the operationalisation of SF payments.
With respect to the latter, theory does not provide an unambiguous indica-
tion. While most studies operationalize SF as a continuous variable, some
studies use a dummy variable to indicate whether a region is an Objective 1
region or not. The latter case has the advantage that data on payments are
not necessary, but it comes with the disadvantage that it is not possible to
measure the real size effect of regional policy. If SF are operationalised as
continuous variable, the studies differ with regard to the question of whether
to express the SF as percent of GDP, in purchasing power parities (PPP)
and/or in per capita terms. Moreover, not all studies use SF payments –
some use data on SF commitments. From our point of view, using (nominal)
SF payments as percent of (nominal) GDP is the most convincing approach
since differences in purchasing powers are cancelled out in a very simple
manner.16
With respect to the econometric methods used, there are various ap-
proaches to dealing with the issues described in the last section. Simple
cross-sectional or pooled OLS estimators are based on the assumption that,
16Incidentally, this is the exact approach chosen in the empirical literature on the growth
effects of foreign aid (Easterly, 2003).
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after conditioning on further explanatory variables, many of the problems
discussed in section 4 (reversed causality, omitted/unobserved variables) are
not relevant. Thus, it seems to be more convincing to rely on panel data
methods which, in fact, most studies do. As mentioned in the last section,
using panel data enables the researcher to eliminate unobserved fixed effects
affecting SF and growth simultaneously.
We start the survey with the studies based on country-level data (Table
2). Ederveen, Gorter, de Mooij and Nahuis (2002) analyse the effects at the
national (EU-12) as well as at the regional (NUTS 2) level. The study only
investigates the effects of the ERDF and applies a pooled OLS estimator:
only conditionally positive growth effects for an EU-12 sample for the time
period 1960-1995 are found (implemented via an interaction term, see equa-
tion (6)). In particular, cohesion support is more likely to be effective for
member states with open economies (such as Ireland) and less likely to be
effective in closed ones (such as Spain). According to the explanation of the
authors, openness disciplines governments, which stimulates more productive
investment of cohesion support.
Beugelsdijk and Eijffinger (2005) restrict their analysis to the programme
period 1995-2001. They focus on the dependency of the effectiveness from
moral hazard behaviour and substitution effects by interacting the SF vari-
able with a corruption index. According to the authors, the moral hazard
effect matters because countries might be inclined not to raise the welfare
level of those regions which are close to the critical value of getting EU sup-
port, as this would possibly imply a reduction in future financial EU support.
Hence, it is possible that the resources are not used for projects that would
have the largest direct and indirect impact, so that the moral hazard effect
might lead to an inappropriate use of SF. The substitution effect means that
SF payments lead to a crowding out of national spending. Using EU-15 data
and different dynamic panel data estimators (including an FD-GMM in or-
der to take endogeneity into account) they find that the hypothesis that SF
contribute to fewer interregional disparities within the current 15 European
countries cannot be rejected. Furthermore, the results do not indicate that
the more corrupt countries use their SF in a less efficient way.
Ederveen, de Groot and Nahuis (2006) analyse the effectiveness of the
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ERDF for the period 1960-1995 using dynamic panel approaches for an EU-
13 sample. Among other econometric techniques, they apply FD-GMM and
SYS-GMM estimators, assuming, however, that the SF payments are strictly
exogenous. They find that SF as such do not improve the countries’ growth
performance. However, they find evidence that they only enhance growth
in those countries with the “right” institutions, that is, countries with a
high economic openness and high direct measures of institutional quality
(such as low inflation and low public debt). From these findings, Ederveen,
de Groot and Nahuis (2006, p. 25) derive consequences for a redesign of the
EU regional policy: In the light of the EU enlargement process, the funds
should be allocated first and foremost toward institution building. Given
institutions of a satisfactory quality, the EU regional policy may be effective
in stimulating growth.
Recently, Ba¨hr (2008) complemented these results by analyzing whether
the degree of decentralisation within countries mattered in the EU-15 dur-
ing the period of 1975-1995. The hypothesis is that, given the sensitiv-
ity of EU Cohesion Policy to specific regional needs, member states with a
higher degree of decentralisation should be able to implement more effective
programmes. An interaction variable comprising SF and a decentralisation
measure is introduced to the model, which is estimated by various panel
estimators. Robustness checks are performed, inter alia, by instrumenting
the SF variable with its own lagged values. While SF cannot be said to be
unambiguously growth promoting in itself, Ba¨hr finds a significantly positive
effect of SF on growth in more decentralised countries. This is explained by
the fact that regional authorities have better information on specific growth
inducing projects, so that there is a more effective regional implementation
of the programs in traditionally decentralised countries.
Bradley and Untiedt (2008) criticise the approaches by Ederveen, Gorter,
de Mooij and Nahuis (2002) as well as those by Ederveen, de Groot and
Nahuis (2006), inter alia, for the following reasons: First, the time period
used includes the time before the fundamental reform of Cohesion Policy in
1989, a period in which payments were relatively low. Second, they point
to misspecifications in the regression (especially with regard to the interac-
tion of SF payments and institutional variables). Third, they criticise the
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assumption of exogeneity of Cohesion Policy and show that the econometric
results are far from being robust (for the expression of fundamental concerns
on the evaluation of growth effects of public policies see Rodrik, 2005).
Table 2 approximately here
Apart from these country analyses, some studies use more detailed data
and focus on the regional level (Table 3).
The conclusions of the analysis of Ederveen, Gorter, de Mooij and Nahuis
(2002) for 183 NUTS-2 regions from 1981 to 1996 using pooled OLS depend
on the convergence model used. Assuming that all regions finally catch up to
the same income level (absolute convergence, i.e., neither further explanatory
variables nor country or regional dummies are included), they find a negative
effect of SF on growth. By contrast, assuming that the convergence process is
limited to convergence within countries (including country dummies and no
further explanatory variables), they do not find a significant effect. Finally,
when assuming region-specific steady-states, that is, including regional fixed
effects, a significantly positive effect is found. The authors conclude from
these results (p. 55) “...the more optimistic one is about convergence in the
long run, the more pessimistic one should be about the impact of Cohesion
Policy, and vice versa [...]. The somewhat grim conclusion must be: either
Cohesion Policy is counterproductive, or regional differences will persist.”
However, one should keep in mind that there are good reasons to assume
that omitting fixed effects (regional dummies) and further control variables
results in biased estimates (see section 4).
Cappelen, Castellacci, Fagerberg and Verspagen (2003) focus on the ques-
tion of whether the SF reform in 1989 has increased the effectiveness of Cohe-
sion Policy by dividing their sample period into two time periods (1980-1988
and 1989-1997). Using these two cross-sections and applying OLS, they find
a positive impact on regional growth. The authors find evidence that SF
are most effective in more developed regions (measured in terms of the un-
employment rate, R&D spending etc), whereas the effectiveness is limited
in “poorer” regions. Furthermore, it turns out that the reform of 1989 has
increased the effectiveness.
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Esposti and Bussoletti (2008) analyse the impact of Objective 1 spending
on regional growth using a data set with 206 NUTS-2 regions covering the
time period 1989-2000. They apply different estimation techniques (such as
DIFF-GMM, SYS-GMM). However, it seems that SF payments are treated
as strictly exogenous and only the lagged dependent variable is instrumented.
They find a positive impact of SF on Objective 1 regions over the whole EU
area, even though its size and statistical significance vary across alternative
estimators. Generally, the impact is quite limited and becomes negligible
or even negative in some regional cases. For instance, when regions are
grouped by country, a negative effect may be observed for German, Greek,
and Spanish Objective 1 regions. By contrast, the French Objective 1 regions
show the highest policy treatment effect.
The study by Puigcerver-Pen˜alver (2007) is based on 41 NUTS-2 regions
in the EU-12. It analyses whether Objective 1 payments to these regions
promoted growth in the period 1989-2000, with SF payments modeled as
being affected by the total factor productivity. Using a fixed effects model it
is shown that the effectiveness depends on the time period. While Cohesion
Policy (Objective 1) had a positive impact in the funding period 1989-1993,
no significantly positive impact can be detected during 1994-1999.
Using a cross-sectional approach, de Freitas, Pereira and Torres (2003)
analyse whether Objective 1 regions grow faster than non-Objective 1 regions
between 1990 and 2001, assuming strict exogeneity of the Objective 1 status.
They find evidence of conditional convergence among EU regions. Moreover,
the quality of national institutions has a positive impact, while there is no
evidence of a correlation between the eligibility for Objective 1 payments and
faster convergence.
Rodr´ıguez-Pose and Fratesi (2004) also focus on Objective 1 regions. The
study not only analyses the time lags of SF effects but also differentiates be-
tween categories of Cohesion Policy, such as (a) support to agriculture and
rural promotion, (b) business and tourism support, (c) investment in human
capital, (d) investment in infrastructure and environment. However, the
analysis is based on SF commitments instead of on SF payments. Applying
fixed effects as well as pooled GLS estimators, they cannot find significant ef-
fects of SF on infrastructure and, to a lesser extent, on business support. By
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contrast, support for agriculture has positive short-term effects on growth,
but these wane quickly; and only investments in education and human cap-
ital – representing only about one-eighth of the total commitments – show
positive and significant returns.
The study by Bouvet (2005) goes one step further by not only investi-
gating the impact of the ERDF spendings on economic growth but also by
analyzing through which channels Cohesion Policy might work, i.e., invest-
ment, total factor productivity or employment (see section (3)). The data
base consists of 118 NUTS-2 regions in the EU-8 from 1975 to 1999. The SF
payments (ERDF) are instrumented with political variables.17 It turns out
that Cohesion Policy has a positive but modest effect on growth. The study
does not find significant evidence that this positive effect works through an
increase in regional investment. By contrast, it is found that Cohesion Pol-
icy increases TFP and employment growth and that these are the channels
through which the policy affects GDP growth.18
As mentioned in section 4, a major econometric problem when using
regional-level data results from omitting regional spillover effects, which may
lead to biased results. Dall’erba and Le Gallo (2008)19 is one of the few
studies that try to cope with this problem. This, however, comes with the
drawback that other econometric issues (regional fixed effects, among others)
are not taken into account. The authors use spatial econometric techniques
for cross-sectional data for 145 regions in 1989-1999. The SF payments are
instrumented, inter alia, with the regions’ distances to Brussels using two-
stage least squares. The results from Dall’erba and Le Gallo (2008) indicate
that significant convergence takes place, but that the SF have no impact on
17The following instrumental variables are used: the interaction term of the coincidence
between local central governments and the coincidence between the central government
and the president of the Commission, the interaction term of the local incumbent dummy
and the coincidence between the central government and the president of the Commis-
sion, the coincidence between local central governments, the local-incumbent dummy
and the national incumbent dummy.
18Bouvet (2005) also examines the determinants of fund allocation. While more funds
are allotted to regions with lower per capita incomes and structural deficiencies, some
evidence of political interference in the allocation process is found.
19In a preceding study, Dall’erba (2005) applies an exploratory spatial analysis and finds
a positive relationship between SF payments and regional growth.
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it.
Ramajo, Ma´rquez, Hewings and Salinas (2008) apply cross-sectional spa-
tial econometric techniques to estimate the speed of convergence for a sample
of 163 regions in the EU-12 over the period 1981-1996. First of all, they find
evidence in favour of the existence of two spatial convergence clubs among
European regions, namely, the presence of two significantly different spatial
clusters formed by regions belonging to Cohesion (Ireland, Greece, Portu-
gal and Spain) and non-Cohesion countries. The estimations indicate that
throughout the period analysed, there is a faster conditional convergence
in relative income levels of the regions belonging to Cohesion countries (5.3
percent) than in the rest of the regions of the EU (3.3 percent). Hence, the
results provide support for policies that are explicitly designed to promote
regional growth in the less-developed regions located in Cohesion countries.
Based on a sample of 1084 NUTS-3 regions (EU-15) over the period of
1995-2004, Falk and Sinabell (2008) investigate the determinants of Objec-
tive 1 payments on the regional growth of GDP per capita in a cross-sectional
analysis. As the Lagrange Multiplier test statistic does not hint at spatial
spillover effects, they focus on robust OLS and weighted-least-squares pro-
cedures. The latter is used in order to control for outliers. In addition, Falk
and Sinabell decompose the growth following the Blinder-Oaxaca decompo-
sition (Oaxaca and Ransom, 1994) in order to check how much of the growth
differential can be explained by observable differences between Objective 1
and non-Objective 1 regions. Their results indicate that there is a significant
growth differential, which is, however, almost entirely due to the difference in
characteristics such as initial GDP per capita, economic structure and pop-
ulation density. As a consequence, these results point to a low effectiveness
of the EU funds.
Mohl and Hagen (2008) use a panel dataset of 124 NUTS-2 regions over
the time period 1995-2005, extending the literature with regard to the follow-
ing aspects: First of all, they use more precise measures of SF by distinguish-
ing between Objective 1, 2, 3 and 1+2+3 payments and by a more thorough
investigation of the impact of time lags. Second, the time period of the in-
vestigation is extended, using SF payments of the last financial framework
2000-2006 that have not been analysed before. Third, the paper examines
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the robustness of the results by comparing various econometric approaches.
Apart from SYS-GMM (which allows for endogeneity of SF payments as well
as of further variables), spatial panel econometric techniques are applied.
The results show that Objective 1 payments in particular promote regional
economic growth, whereas Objectives 2 and 3 do not have a positive and
significant impact on the EU regions’ growth rates. Furthermore, Mohl and
Hagen find that time lags substantially affect the results, i.e., the growth
impact does not occur immediately, but rather with a time lag of up to five
years.
Finally, there are two papers that use treatment effect methods in order
to deal with the problem of unknown functional form and parameter hetero-
geneity (Wooldridge, 2002, Ch. 18). Becker, Egger, von Ehrlich and Fenge
(2008) use up to 3301 NUTS-3 regions and apply “regression discontinuity
design” techniques.20 They make use of the relatively clear-cut rule that
defines an Objective 1 region: NUTS-2 regions with a GDP per capita level
below 75 percent of the EU average. This enables the authors to use regres-
sion discontinuity design techniques, which basically means estimating the
effect by comparing “treated” and “non-treated” regions near the 75 percent
threshold. On average, the Objective 1 status raises per-capita income by
about 1.8 percent relative to similar “non-treated” regions. Since the authors
do not find a positive employment effect, they conclude that the growth effect
may work through an investment increasing effect. Furthermore, they pro-
vide a simple cost-benefit analysis: one euro spent on Objective 1 transfers
leads to 1.21 euros of additional GDP in the eligible regions.
Hagen and Mohl (2008) interpret total SF payments (Objective 1+2+3)
as a “continuous treatment” and apply the method of generalised propensity
score which leads to the estimation of a dose-response function as proposed by
Hirano and Imbens (2004). They use a sample of 122 NUTS-1 and NUTS-
2 (EU-15) regions for the time period 1995-2005 and find a positive, but
not statistically significant, impact on the regions’ average three-year growth
rates. This would imply that it does not matter which “dose” of SF payments
a region receives.
20An introduction to regression discontinuity design can be found in the Journal of Econo-
metrics 142 (2008); see especially Imbens and Lemieux (2008).
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Table 3 approximately here
Besides the studies presented above, there are further studies focusing on
regions within single countries (see Table 4). Since their focus may be too
narrow to draw a conclusion with regard to European integration, we do not
discuss them here.
Table 4 approximately here
6 Conclusions and remarks for future research
The Cohesion Policy of the European Union has gained importance over the
recent decades, becoming the most important budget item and totaling 36
percent of the total EU budget in the period 2007-2013. With its rising
relevance, the attempts to evaluate this policy field have increased. Despite
its primary goal to “reduce disparities among the regions”, surprisingly, the
focus of these studies is not so much on the question if EU Cohesion Policy
has decreased divergence, but rather on the question if EU support is growth
enhancing. One reason for this might be that the question of convergence
refers to a long-run concept, which is difficult to evaluate given the available
empirical data.
This chapter shows that the econometric evaluation of EU Cohesion Pol-
icy is hampered by several econometric issues, namely reverse causality, mea-
surement error, omitted variables (including spatial spillovers), Nickell bias,
strict functional form assumptions and the potential inclusion of inappro-
priate control variables. Based on these issues we present potential solu-
tions on how to cope with these problems individually. Unfortunately, given
the econometric methods and the available data base, there is currently no
method to control for all problems mentioned above simultaneously. As a
consequence, by comparing the results of several approaches, one has to de-
rive conclusions on the robustness of the results.
As the data availability for EU Cohesion Policy payments has improved
significantly over the last years, we would argue that meaningful results
should be based on panel data, which reduces some of the main econometric
problems. Moreover, it is advisable to use studies taking fixed effects into
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account and/or studies that attempt to solve the problem of reverse causal-
ity. With this in mind, we count 10 studies (including two papers applying
treatment effects models) that consider these aspects.
At the country level, the most that can be concluded from empirical
studies is that Cohesion Policy seems to be only conditionally effective. Given
a good quality institutional setup (Ederveen, de Groot and Nahuis, 2006), or
decentralised governmental structures (Ba¨hr, 2008), Cohesion Policy has a
positive impact on growth. However, the methodological problems discussed
in section 4 should be kept in mind. For example, many studies do not
allow for endogeneity of Cohesion Policy. Hence, one should be careful when
interpreting the results.
Using regional level data might be a preferable alternative because, first,
EU Cohesion Policy focuses on the development and convergence of regions
and, second, the robustness of the results is increased by the higher number
of cross sections. One drawback is that structural funds data at the regional
level is limited to the time period 1995-2006. There are four studies control-
ling for the endogeneity problem using regional level data, three of which find
at least a limited positive impact of structural funds payments. Moreover,
using regional data without controlling for spatial spillover effects increases
the problem of an omitted variable bias. There are three papers applying
spatial techniques that find, again, weak evidence for a positive impact of
structural funds. However, the disadvantage of these methods is that it is
currently not possible to control for both spatial spillover effects and the
endogeneity of several independent variables.
One explanation for the weak results might be the fact that almost all
studies are derived from a neoclassical growth model assuming that EU Co-
hesion Policy increases investments, which ultimately raises the economic
growth rate. However, the results by Bouvet (2005) and Hagen and Mohl
(2009) suggest that EU Cohesion Policy may only have a modest impact
on investments. These results might simply indicate that the EU support
crowds out national investments. Moreover, we know very little about the
labour market impact of EU Cohesion Policy. Hence, one task for future
studies will be to more thoroughly investigate the channels through which
EU Cohesion Policy works.
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Another reason for the inconclusive empirical results might be that the
allocation of funds is at least partly determined by political-economic factors.
In this context, Cohesion Policy is not solely based on clear criteria. Hence,
there is room for political bargaining and/or side payments which might
result in the funding of politically feasible, and less economically efficient,
projects.
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Appendix
Figure 1: Development of total EU Cohesion Policy payments
Source: European Commission (2008).
Figure 2: Cohesion Policy payments and public investments, as % of GDP
Note: The time periods of observations differ between countries. As a consequence, in brackets the first
year of observation is listed.
Source: European Commission and AMECO.
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Figure 3: Sluggish adaptation process to EU funding
Source: Heinemann, Hagen, Mohl, Osterloh and Sellenthin (2009).
Table 1: Structural funds Objectives, 1994–2006
1994-1999 2000-2006
Definition share of Definition share of
total SF total SF
Obj. 1: To promote the development and struc-
67.6%
Obj. 1: Supporting development in the
69.7%
tural adjustment of regions whose development less prosperous regions
is lagging behind the rest of the EU
Obj. 6: Assisting the development of sparsely
0.5%
populated regions (Sweden & Finland only)
Obj. 2: To convert regions seriously affected
11.1%
Obj. 2: To support the economic and
11.5%by industrial decline social conversion of areas experiencing
Obj. 5b: Facilitating the development and
4.9%
structural difficulties
structural adjustment of rural areas
Obj. 3: To combat long-term unemployment
9.4%
Obj. 3: To support the adaptation and
12.3%
and facilitate the integration of young people modernisation of education, training and
and of persons excluded from the labour market employment policies in regions not eligible
into working life under Obj. 1
Obj. 4: To facilitate the adaptation of workers
1.6%to industrial changes and to changes in produc-
tion systems
Source: European Commission.
31
Table 2: Econometric studies on the effects of Cohesion Policy using country-level data
Paper by Central results: Operationalisation Time Units Econometric
Impact of SF on economic growth of structural funds period methods used
Ba¨hr (2008) Only in countries with a high degree of ERDF payments 1975-1995 13 EU Panel:
decentralisation do SF have a positive (as % of GDP) Countries Pooled OLS, FE,
impact on growth [exogenous,endogenous] FE-IV
Ederveen, de Groot SF promote growth and convergence ERDF payments 1975-1995 12/13 EU Panel:
and Nahuis (2006) given the “right” institutional (as % of GDP) countries Pooled OLS, FE,
set-up [exogenous] FD-GMM
Beugelsdijk and SF promote growth. More “corrupt” SF payments 1995-2001 15 EU Panel:
Eijffinger (2005) countries do not gain less from CP (as % of GDP) countries FD-GMM
with respect to growth [endogenous]
Ederveen, Gorter, de Only in open economies do SF have a ERDF payments 1960-1995 12 EU Panel:
Mooij and Nahuis positive impact on growth (as % of GDP) countries Pooled OLS
(2002) [exogenous]
Notes: OLS = ordinary least squares, FE = fixed effects model, IV = instrumental variable, FD-GMM = first difference generalised method of moments
estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1991), SYS-GMM = system generalised method of moments estimator (Blundell and Bond, 1998).
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Table 3: Econometric studies on the effects of Cohesion Policy using European-wide regional level data
Paper by Central results: Operationalisation Time Units Econometric
Impact of SF on economic growth of structural funds period methods used
Becker, Egger, Positive and significant growth effect Dummy variable = 1 1989-1993, up to 3301 Panel:
von Ehrlich and of Obj. 1 regions for regions receiving 1994-1999, NUTS-3 Regression discon-
Fenge (2008) Obj. 1 funding, 0 else 2000-2006 regions tinuity analysis
[exogenous] (EU-12/25)
Dall’erba and SF have no statistically significant SF payments and remaining 1989-1999 145 Cross-section:
Le Gallo (2008) impact on regional convergence commitments from 1994- NUTS-2 Spatial lag model
1999 (as % of GDP) regions with IV
[endogenous] (EU-12)
Esposti and Limited impact of SF on regional Obj. 1 payments per 1989-1999 206 Panel:
Bussoletti growth capita (in PPS) NUTS-2 FD-GMM, SYS-GMM
(2008) [exogenous] regions
(EU-15)
Falk and SF have a marginal positive and Dummy variable = 1 1995-2004 1084 Panel:
Sinabell significant growth impact for regions receiving NUTS-3 Pooled OLS, median
(2008) Obj. 1 funding, 0 else regions regression approach,
[exogenous] (EU-15) weighted least squares
Hagen and SF have a positive, but not Obj. 1+2+3 payments and 1995-2005 122 Panel:
Mohl (2008) statistically significant impact remaining commitments NUTS-1/2 Generalised propensity
on regional growth from 1994-99 (as % of GDP) regions score approach
[exogenous] (EU-15)
Mohl and Obj. 1 payments promote growth, Obj. 1,2,3,1+2+3 payments 1995-2005 122 Panel:
Hagen (2008) whereas Obj. 2 and 3 payments do and remaining commitments NUTS-1/2 FE, SYS-GMM, spatial
not have a positive impact from 1994-99 (as % in GDP) regions lag and error model
[endogenous,exogenous] (EU-15)
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Table 3: Econometric studies on the effects of Cohesion Policy using European-wide regional level data
Paper by Central results: Operationalisation Time Units Econometric
Impact of SF on economic growth of structural funds period methods used
Ramajo, Faster cond. convergence of relative Separate regressions for 1981-1996 163 Cross-section:
Ma´rquez, income levels of regions belonging regions belonging to NUTS-2 Robust OLS,
Hewings and to Cohesion countries than in non- Cohesion countries vs. regions spatial lag model
Salinas (2008) Cohesion regions non-Cohesion countries (EU-12)
Puigcerver- Positive effect of SF on growth rates Total SF (as % of GDP 1989-1999, 41 Panel:
Pen˜alver (2007) of Obj. 1 regions in 1989-1993, but p.c.); total SF; SF of 1989-1993 NUTS-2 Pooled OLS, FE
not in 1994-1999 region i over total SF regions
received by all regions (EU-10)
[exogenous]
Bouvet (2005) SF have a modest positive impact ERDF payments per 1975-1999 111 Panel:
on regional growth rates; SF work capita NUTS-1/2 Pooled OLS, FE, IV
by increasing the growth of TFP [endogenous] regions
and employment (EU-8)
Dall’erba (2005) Positive relationship between SF SF payments and remain- 1989-1999 145 Cross-section
and regional growth ing commitments from NUTS-2 Exploratory spatial
1994-1999 (as % of GDP) regions data analysis
[exogenous] (EU-12)
Cappelen, SF have a positive and significant Obj. 1, 2, 5b 1980-1997, 105 Cross-section:
Castellacci, impact on the growth rates; they (as % of GDP) 1980-1988, NUTS-1/2 OLS
Fagerberg and are more effective since 1988 [exogenous] 1989-1997 regions
Verspagen (2003) (EU-9)
Rodriguez-Pose Limited impact of SF on growth; Obj. 1 commitments 1989-1999 152 Cross-section & Panel:
and Fratesi only SF funding on education and (as % of GDP) NUTS-2 OLS, pooled GLS
(2004) human capital have positive [exogenous] regions FE
effects (EU-8)
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Table 3: Econometric studies on the effects of Cohesion Policy using European-wide regional level data
Paper by Central results: Operationalisation Time Units Econometric
Impact of SF on economic growth of structural funds period methods used
de Freitas, Obj. 1 regions do not show faster Dummy variable = 1 1990-2001 196 Cross-section:
Pereira and convergence than non-Obj. 1 regions for regions receiving NUTS-2 OLS
Torres (2003) Obj. 1 funding, 0 else regions
[exogenous] (EU-15)
Ederveen, Results depend on the assumptions SF + Cohesion Fund 1981-1996 183 Panel:
Gorter, underlying the convergence model (as % of GDP) NUTS-2 Pooled OLS
de Mooij [exogenous] regions
Nahuis (2002) (EU-13)
Notes: OLS = ordinary least squares, FE = fixed effects model, IV = instrumental variable, FD-GMM = first difference generalised method of moments
estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1991), SYS-GMM = system generalised method of moments estimator (Blundell and Bond, 1998).35
Table 4: Econometric studies on the effects of Cohesion Policy using regional level data within single countries
Paper by Central results: Operationalisation Time Units Econometric
Impact of SF on economic growth of structural funds period methods used
Eggert, SF accelerate a region’s convergence, SF payments 1989-1993, 16 NUTS-1 Cross-section:
von Ehrlich, but reduce the average growth rate (as % of GDP) 1994-1999, regions Pooled OLS, Regress
Fenge and [exogenous] (Germany) average growth of 1994-99
Ko¨nig (2008) (2000-04) on average SF
of 1989-93 (1993-99)
Soukiazis and SF promote convergence; small positive ERDF per capita 1991-1999 30 Panel:
Antunes (2006) impact on growth; more effective in [exogenous] NUTS-3 Pooled OLS, FE,
coastal than in interior regions regions Random Effects
(Portugal)
Percoco (2005) SF induce a high level of volatility Obj. 1 payments 1994-1999 6 Panel:
in the level of growth rates (as % of GDP) NUTS-2 GMM-IV
[endogenous] regions
(Italy)
Garcia-Mila` and Grants are not effective in stimulating Grants = Eur. + national 1977-1981, 17 Panel:
McGuire (2001) private investment or improving the grants; Dummy var. = 1 1989-1992 NUTS-2 OLS and difference-in-
overall economies of the poorer regions for regions receives above- regions difference approach
average grants, 0 else (Spain)
[exogenous]
Notes: OLS = ordinary least squares, FE = fixed effects model, IV = instrumental variable, FD-GMM = first difference generalised method of moments
estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1991), SYS-GMM = system generalised method of moments estimator (Blundell and Bond, 1998).
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